We model interhousehold transfers between nomadic livestock herders as the state-dependent consequence of individuals' strategic interdependence resulting from the existence of multiple, opposing externalities. A public good security externality among individuals sharing a social (e.g., ethnic) identity in a potentially hostile environment creates incentives to band together. Self-interested interhousehold wealth transfers from wealthier herders to poorer ones may emerge endogenously within a limited wealth space as a means to motivate accompanying migration by the recipient. The distributional reach and size of the transfer are limited, however, by a resource appropriation externality related to the use of common property grazing lands. When this effect dominates, it can induce transfers from households who want to relieve grazing pressures caused by others' herds. Our model augments the extant literature on transfers, and is perhaps more consistent with the limited available empirical evidence on heterogeneous and changing transfers' patterns among east African pastoralists. The core principles of our model possibly apply more broadly, for example to long-distance migrants or even among "foot soldiers" in street gangs.
Introduction
Scholars' explanations of interhousehold transfers serve as allegories for our understanding of human nature and the social environment that conditions human behavior. This topic has consequently been a source of dispute within most disciplines in the humanities and the social sciences. Since at least the 17 th century, philosophers have disagreed as to whether altruism is merely apparent, meaning that even states of mind that are directed towards the welfare of others ultimately aim at advancing one's own pleasure (Hobbes 1650 , Hobbes 1651 , Butler 1726 .
Within anthropology, substantivists such as Scott (1976) have long argued that transfers arise from a "moral economy" in which prevailing ethical values such as generosity and individuals' primordial right to subsistence assure support for the poor, while rationalists such as Popkin (1979) have countered that what appears to be a moral economy can be wholly explained by selfinterested, opportunistic individual behavior. A fierce debate likewise rages within contemporary theology on these questions, drawing on Mauss' classic The Gift (1966) to argue whether humans ever undertake non-self-interested, non-manipulative giving (Milbank 1997, Caputo and Scanlon 1999) . Examples from other disciplines are not difficult to find.
Economists have engaged this debate as well. Some explain interhousehold transfers as the result of altruistic preferences or some sort of moral code that constrains individual choice out of a sense of fairness or noblesse oblige, perhaps complemented by the "warm glow" effects the giver enjoys from impure giving (Phelps 1975 , Andreoni 1989 , Samuelson 1993 , Coate 1995 , Smith et al. 1995 , Kirchler et al. 1996 , Barrett 1999 . Others explain transfers as an endogenously supportable insurance mechanism adopted by purely self-interested individuals to cope with an environment of imperfect information and missing financial markets in which individuals interact repeatedly (Kimball 1988 , Fafchamps 1992 , Coate and Ravallion 1993 , Townsend 1994 , Platteau 2000 . We accept the veracity of these two canonical models in explaining many interhousehold transfers. Surely some people provide insurance for one another and some can be gracious toward those who suffer in their midst. However, the limited empirical evidence among the east African pastoralists we have been studying intensely for the past decade seems inconsistent with either explanation.
This paper therefore develops an alternative model appropriate to the particular setting we seek to understand, but the core principles of which might apply elsewhere as well, as we discuss in the concluding section. In our model, transfers are a self-interested, manipulative gesture motivated by the strategic interdependence of individuals sharing both access to a productive resource and a common social identity in a potentially hostile environment. In our model, giving is intrinsically costly but can nonetheless be instrumentally valuable to the giver if it motivates the recipient to undertake a self-interested action that has a positive spillover benefit for the donor. Put differently, transfers can serve as costly but desirable coordinating mechanisms among interdependent actors.
This is explicitly not a model of pure altruism nor of impure altruism due to "warm glow effects" (Andreoni 1989) , because individuals value only their own welfare and not the act of giving. Nor is this a model that relies on a patron-client relationship, in which marked inequalities in wealth, status or power give rise to vertical insurance systems or exchange of nontraded services (e.g., protection) for tradable goods and services such as material tribute or labor (Scott 1976 , Fafchamps 1992 , Carter 1997 , Platteau 1995 ). In our model, no exchange of services occurs; redistribution occurs only with limited inequality in wealth and can be either distributionally progressive or regressive. Finally, this is neither insurance nor investment in social capital, because ours is a static model in which transfers do not occur in response to idiosyncratic shocks to agents' wealth or income and there is no opportunity for reciprocal behavior.
In our model, a voluntary, self-interested wealth transfer is essentially a side payment for a migration decision the recipient only prefers ex post, after having received the 'gift'. While the transfer may well strengthen the recipient's inclination towards 'cooperative' behavior (Fehr et al. 1997 , Akerlof 1982 or elicit his penchant for reciprocity (Bowles et al. 1997) , the 'service' the recipient offers -through the migration choice he makes -is unambiguously in his own interest.
Like in the Bernheim et al. (1985) model of strategic bequests, the wealth transfer is strategic in that it influences the recipient's choice of actions. Such transfers are manipulative in nature. But unlike the individually costly services -such as care, visits, attention (Cox 1987 , Bernheim et al. 1985 , sense of worth and status (Offer 1997) , and remittances (Lucas and Stark 1985) 1 -considered in prior investigations of exchange-based motives for private transfers, the service returned by the recipient to the giver in our model is not costly at all, as it merely originates in the externality effects generated by the recipient's self-interested, post-transfer choice. 2 We motivate and situate our model in the context of east African pastoralists whose livelihoods depend on the extensive grazing of livestock. One novelty of the current study is that we identify how transfers can be risk reducing and/or productivity enhancing for the donor household. As noted by many observers of pastoral economies, the area that a given user group calls its grazing area is frequently defined by ambiguous borders (Schlee 1989 , Oba 1992 , Goodhue and McCarthy 2000 , Haro et al. 2005 . The flexible and contested nature of these boundaries creates an incentive for donor households to support recipient households. Donor households have an interest in ensuring that their own group maintains access to contested production areas and to repel attacks by other groups. Insufficient livestock not only threatens a household with a food security crisis, but also threatens neighboring households with the potential loss of an ally in a hostile environment due to the existence of wealth thresholds that determine a household's ability to migrate (Lybbert et al. 2004 , Barrett et al. 2006 , Santos and Barrett 2006b ).
As a result, progressive transfers may occur from richer to poorer households.
1 Like Lucas and Stark's (1985) theory of remittance behavior, we view transfers as a mechanism for redistributing the gains from some jointly agreeable action. As a result, the transfers can endogenously vanish when the contract is no longer mutually beneficial. 2 Our 'service' does share with some of the previous models the important feature of having no close market substitutes.
The production externality commonly assumed to exist in common property models is consequently not the full story of strategic interdependence. This production externality must be balanced against a security externality that arises from the possibility that there is "safety in numbers". As many common property resource areas are vast and only loosely controlled by a state exercising police authority, concerns about security in such areas may be important.
Yet common property resource externalities matter. Indeed, as long as some basic level of public goods are provided in particular locations, such appropriation externalities may even give rise to modest, distributionally regressive transfers from poorer to wealthier households, although the empirical evidence of such transfers occurring is thin. We further argue that declines in mobility and transfers in pastoral areas of east Africa can be at least partly explained as the result of the exogenous local, provision of public goods. As the state expands its reach into pastoral areas, it brings both security in the form of police forces and some low-level safety net in the form of food aid and other transfers. These services are typically confined to areas around towns, leading subpopulations to become more reliant on exogenously supplied public goods, while others remain more reliant on the endogenous private provision of public goods. A gradual reduction in transfers and mobility in pastoral societies could then be at least partially due to increased localized provision of public goods. Finally, our model offers insights into how the incomplete provision of public services can lead to non-convex production functions commonly associated with poverty traps.
Background on East African Pastoralists
We develop our model around our observations of livestock transfers between nomadic pastoralists in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) of east Africa. These pastoralists' livelihoods depend almost entirely on extensive livestock production in regions subject to frequent drought and violent intergroup conflict. Traditionally, ASAL herders migrated with their herds in search of pasture and water for their animals. Herders survived mainly by consuming the milk, meat, and blood of their herds. Few permanent settlements existed in pastoral areas in the pre-colonial and colonial eras. The few settlements that existed were almost exclusively occupied by traders.
Pastoral households would temporarily occupy areas near these trading points when conditions were favorable and move on as other areas become more favorable.
The boundaries within which households moved were flexible and contested. The process of groups pushing into new areas or being pushed out of old areas was a constant fact of life.
3 Areas that were accessible to members of a group at one point in time were not guaranteed to be accessible in the future. Groups commonly raided others' herds in order to augment their own wealth, particularly when there was ample grazing land and water available elsewhere to sustain larger herds. Defense of a given area and of a group's livestock was the responsibility of group members, as was the potential conquest of neighboring areas. Membership in a social group was thus critical for ensuring access to grazing lands and security of one's wealth.
Group membership also involved access to a set of livestock transfer arrangements that occur almost exclusively within ethnic groups (Schneider 1979 , Perlov 1987 , McCabe 1987 , Ensminger 1992 , Little 1992 . 4 These transfers keep people who have lost their animals as mobile members of the group, thus enabling these members to continue to help provide for the common defense of herds and grazing areas.
One of the main motivations for this study is that recent empirical work with household data gathered in pastoral areas yields some surprising conclusions with regard to transfer behavior that are difficult to reconcile with existing interpretations of transfers in the literature. For example, the core predictions of a model of selfless giving would be that giving increases with wealth and transfers flow disproportionately to the poorest agents within the system. From an anthropological perspective, Maybury-Lewis (1992) describes transfers as following this logicalbeit with shame replacing altruism -quoting a pastoral elder who stated that transfers occur since "we must give to those who need it, for a poor man shames us all" (p.85).
This contrasts with contemporary empirical evidence on transfer behavior. First, the evidence suggests that transfers do not go to the very poor. Desta's (1999) data show that among Borana pastoralists in southern Ethiopia, the poorest and richest quartiles of herders were only one-sixth and one-fourth as likely, respectively, to receive livestock gifts or loans as the central half of the wealth distribution. Santos and Barrett (2006a) , using different data from the same population, similarly find that those with the smallest herds are statistically less likely to receive livestock transfers from other households. McPeak (2006) finds that relative wealth differences across households in a given period have very little quantitative impact on transfer flows. In fact, some recent findings suggest that transfers at times flow from the poor to relatively better off (albeit still poor) households (Lybbert et al. 2004, Santos and Barrett 2006a) . Further, the sense of shame induced by having members of the society become poor is difficult to reconcile with the observable fact that the very poor are commonly abandoned, left to turn to begging, prostitution, and illicit drug and alcohol trade in grim rangeland towns (Little et al. 2001) .
A different interpretation in the anthropological literature stresses the risk sharing aspect of transfers. Transfers among pastoralists are clearly socially embedded behaviors that take place in a highly risky production system, which has naturally led many observers to the conjecture that they represent a form of social insurance (Torry 1973 , Schlee 1989 , Oba 1992 ). Anthropological studies have described transfers using terms such as "an indigenous social security system" (Oba 1992, p. 66) and "insurance against loss from drought, epidemics and human and animal predators…" (Schlee 1989, p.56) .
Unfortunately, the informal insurance argument -the notion that transfers represent compensatory payments for idiosyncratic shocks among herders -likewise does not seem to offer a compelling explanation of the transfer patterns observed among contemporary pastoralists in east Africa. Recent econometric studies find that the flows involved are very small in relation to the losses suffered, not just in absolute terms but even relative to losses experienced within the relevant mutual insurance community. Lybbert et al. (2004) in the region over the past generation (Lybbert et al., 2004) .
Those who rely on altruism or mutual insurance models of transfers must therefore explain the apparent decline in interhousehold transfers as reflecting 'moral decay' or cultural decline. Of course, this begs the question of why such decay could have happened. Our model does not rely on vague notions of moral decay to explain declining transfers. Rather, we hypothesize that major changes in the bio-physical and socio-economic environment of pastoralists in ASAL have induced the apparent, sharp decline in transfers. In the present setting, we identify three key changes. Since the droughts of the early 1970's, the provision of food aid to pastoral areas has become increasingly frequent and the growth of towns has been rapid. Small towns that sprang up around relief distribution sites in the ASAL have rapidly expanded. In the six northern Kenyan sites in which we work, no effort has been made at targeting households (Lentz and Barrett 2005) . Instead, identical food aid packages are given to all residents who request them and most households receive food aid every period. So there is basically a lump sum payment made to those living in and around settlements in the form of exogenously provided food aid thus creating an incentive to be in or around towns. 6 As we discuss later, food aid flows in response to covariate rainfall shocks have also increased over this period. If these were well-targeted based on household-specific shocks, this could salvage the insurance Another important change relates to the growing and now relatively high level of violence in the rangelands. Livestock raiding between ethnic groups has long been a feature of pastoral areas (Bollig 1992 , Markakis 1993 , Hendrickson et al. 1996 . 7 However, over the past thirty years, the growth in ownership of small arms has made traditional conflicts over pasture, water, and livestock increasingly lethal as civil strife in Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda has created an abundant supply of automatic weapons at low prices (Oba 1992 , Hussein et al. 1999 , Osamba 2000 . Government security forces rarely are able to stop these conflicts in extensive grazing lands. Whether due to lack of manpower, supplies, or interest, they more commonly concern themselves with security issues in and around the small towns where they are posted. Government provided security is largely a matter of protecting town dwellers, while nomadic households are left to defend themselves as best as they can.
The third key change is that pastoralist mobility is widely perceived to have deteriorated over the past generation or so due to loss of spatial refugia to expanding rangeland towns, to extensification of rainfed crop cultivation into traditional dry season grazing areas, to recently gazetted parks and protected areas, and to violently contested no-man's-lands (Coppock 1994 , Desta 1999 , Fleisher 1999 , Heald 1999 . Mobility is key to wealth accumulation and conservation in the ASAL (Little 1992 , McPeak and Barrett 2001 , Lybbert et al. 2004 ) because microclimatic variability, soil and altitude differences, and uneven spatial distribution of animals give rise to patchy and time varying rangeland carrying capacity and productivity (Behnke et al. 1993, Ellis and Swift 1998) . Social identity matters as well to resource access and has become more fixed over time with the emergence of permanent town settlements. Much open rangeland and many explanation of declining transfers, due to the crowding out of private transfers by public ones. But since household-level food aid receipts in this region are commonly lump sum transfers across households and uncorrelated with household wealth, income or idiosyncratic income or wealth shocks (Lentz and Barrett 2005) , these should not (and empirically, do not seem to) affect interhousehold transfers in response to idiosyncratic shocks. Thus the puzzle remains. 7 Cattle raiding and its attendant violence are occasionally inter-clan within some ethnic groups as well. In this paper, for the sake of clarity, we simplify in assuming violence is solely between ethnic groups which is most common in the area we study.
watering points continue either unmanaged (open access) or governed by overlapping, "fuzzy"
property rights (Goodhue and McCarthy 1999) . These areas are typically contested by multiple social groups. Other, common property areas surrounding the towns are, by contrast, generally available only to members of a particular ethnic group or clan.
In the following section, we develop a model that captures and explains many of the facts just reported. We illustrate the interconnectedness of herd mobility, herd size, and transfers and show how the localized provision of relief food and security can influence these relationships.
This permits explanation of both the apparently striking change over time in transfer behavior among pastoralists and the current observed transfer patterns that appear consistent with neither prevailing economic theories of altruistic preferences nor of social insurance and reciprocity.
A Model of Individual Migration Choice
The analysis in this section focuses on a single agent's binary decision over whether to migrate his herd or not and aims at elucidating the differential and conditional impacts of migration determinants. This analysis is partly for its own sake, as it helps explain some stylized facts about pastoralism and apparent changes in the rangelands. It is also foundational, for in section 4
we will generalize these behaviors to allow for the simultaneous, strategically interdependent behaviors of multiple agents and allow the propositions with respect to migration derived in this section to inform our understanding of the evolution of interhousehold transfers among east African pastoralists.
The essence of the model we present is that there exist two externalities, an appropriation externality associated with potential site-specific overgrazing -the classic "tragedy of the commons" effect -and a physical security externality reflecting "strength in numbers" effects vis-à-vis hostile common opponents. Which of these effects dominates in a given setting depends on herd sizes across agents in different ethnic groups, the level of external transfers available, and prevailing ecological conditions on the range. As we show in section 4, when the public security externality dominates, some agents may make limited strategic asset transfers to somewhat poorer kinfolk in order to induce allies to migrate with them to a potentially dangerous location. When the appropriation externality dominates, some households may transfer wealth to kin in order to induce them to migrate away and thereby relieve pressures on the common property grazing area.
Under certain assumptions, these transfers might even be regressive, flowing from poorer to richer households, although this phenomenon appears rare in practice. Overall, this model predicts precisely the sorts of current transfer patterns reported in the previous section, and can explain the shift over time that seems to have taken place in pastoralists' interhousehold transfer behavior. This framework is likewise consistent with the common sociological observation that individuals sharing a common identity frequently appear as allies in one setting (e.g., when faced with a common adversary in distant locations) and as competitors in other domains (e.g., over scarce forage and water for their herds near their homelands).
We structure the model in such a way as to underscore that neither insurance nor altruism could motivate the transfers that endogenously result. 8 We use this structure not because we do not believe that altruism or insurance are factors in the complex reality of east African pastoralism, but rather to isolate this new mechanism we model, which seems to offer a conceptual reconciliation with the empirical evidence on east African pastoralists that extant models of transfers fail to provide.
a. The agents and locations
Consider a two-area setting (respectively, a base camp near an established settlement, B, and a more distant satellite area, S). Define the livestock carrying capacity of each area , and a given herd size of a rival group at the satellite area so as to be able to focus on the determinants of pastoralist migration. In the next section we relax this exogeneity assumption and explore the strategically interdependent migration decisions of the two herders and the distribution-conditional transfer regime that results endogenously.
b. Appropriation and security externalities
When the number of animals occupying an area exceeds its variable carrying capacity, productivity-degrading overgrazing results. Hence, in the event of excessive resource competition, an appropriation externality arises, wherein one herder's migration choice affects the productivity of other herders' animals. The herders (sharing a common identity) in the base area Production is increasing in area-specific growth potential and actual rainfall. The common property appropriation externality negatively affects the production function only when the area-specific carrying capacity is exceeded. In the absence of the common property externality, 12 the pastoralist's production is unambiguously increasing in individual herd size.
Other herders' migration decisions matter not only because of prospective resource competition but also due to possible security externalities. If herders 1 and 2 both migrate to the satellite area, then because of inter-ethnic violence and/or livestock raiding they both risk a loss of animals. 13 Denote this security risk, again expressed as an expected proportional per animal 11 Note that by construction, L 3 B equals zero. 12 Both Lybbert et al. (2004) and McPeak (2005) find empirical evidence that mortality and productivity, respectively, do not necessarily fall with increased livestock in an area, underscoring that appropriation externalities are not ubiquitous and may frequently be dominated by security externalities. 13 Today, violence and raiding risk almost entirely exist in the satellite areas of the hinterland. The townbased provision of public security services in the form of police protection provides reasonable assurance against raiding losses around towns. We simplify this to perfect assurance in the model. Prior to the productivity loss, as θ Є [0, 1] . At the satellite area, this security risk θ is a decreasing function of the aggregate herd size L 1 +L 2 . Intuitively, since security critically depends on human labor rather than herd size and given that treks are typically made in roughly fixed herder/herd size proportions, the larger the aggregate herd size, the more herders around to fend off the common enemy. There is strength in numbers in the sense that the presence of another member of a herder's ethnic group reduces his expected losses due to raiding and violence through a security externality. Hence, a common identity in the satellite area makes pastoralists allies.
14 Without loss of generality, we assume that security risk θ = 0 at the base camp since the pastoralists who belong to a different social group never try to occupy the common property lands of another 
c. Exogenous transfers and movement costs
As mentioned in section 2, food aid has become nearly ubiquitous in the rangeland towns of the East African ASAL. We therefore introduce an exogenous transfer from outside the system, τ, which pastoralists only receive if they are at base camp, where they have ready access to townintroduction of town-based public services a few generations ago, however, there was no practical distinction between base and satellite areas, so raiding threats were nearly omnipresent. 14 The value of the security risk also increases with the herd size of the rival group, L 3 . Furthermore, it reflects the availability and trafficking of weapons in the region, political tensions between groups, and other factors that are unrelated to stocking rate pressures in the satellite areas of the rangelands. We thus assume the two externalities are not directly linked, as it appears that little contemporary violence and livestock raiding in this setting is in fact linked to competition for grazing area (Yirbecho et al. 2004 ) that affects their payoffs. Utility is assumed to be increasing in income and, at the time of deciding whether to migrate, the key environmental parameters that shape the appropriation and security externalities are known to all. 17 The choice problem faced by pastoralist 1 is thus:
(1)
The first term of our expression for Y 1 represents pastoralist 1's payoff if he migrates to the satellite area, whereas the second term captures his payoff when staying at the base area. Both 15 Since food aid distribution in the region is typically independent of a pastoralists' wealth, we treat this as a lump sum that is identical for all pastoralists. Our assumption that food aid is available only in the base camp is an obvious oversimplification. The key feature is that leaving the satellite area to come to town to receive food aid entails a nontrivial fixed cost. For simplicity's sake, we model this cost as prohibitive. 16 There are other prospective benefits to being near town: access to markets and thus a wider variety of consumer goods, more timely information from the outside world, etc. These other location-specific amenities merely reinforce the basic logic of our model, namely that the rise of localized provision of public services changes migration and transfer patterns. 17 For expositional purposes, we present our model for the case of risk-neutral agents only. Risk aversion merely complicates the analysis without adding substantially different insights.
terms include an expression for the pastoralist's effective herd productivity, defined as his ex ante herd size adjusted for the expected impacts of the appropriation and security externalities, multiplied by the site-specific per animal productivity.
Pastoralist 1 then rationally decides to move to the satellite camp (m 1 = 1) if and only if
The lefthand side of (2) 
mc(.), and τ(.).
Let us define the individual-specific migration threshold, 
The righthand side of inequality (3) 
. 18 The area-specific gross total products, P S and P B , and are indeed concave functions of L 1 given that θ is a convex function of L 1 and that aggregate herd size, L 1 +L 2 , exceeds 2 under any realistic scenario.
Given the apparent empirical regularity among east African pastoralists that herd size is positively related to the probability of migration, 19 we henceforth assume that the difference in rangeland carrying capacity between satellite and base areas is indeed great enough that wealthier pastoralists are ceteris paribus more likely to migrate than poorer pastoralists. This leads to the following proposition: 
In the case where m 2 = 1, the numerator of (4) takes the form 2's herd size at the satellite area, pastoralist 1 is more likely to migrate to the satellite area, then 19 The simple bivariate correlation coefficient of L 1 and m 1 equals 0.352 using the 1560 observations of quarterly household-level data from Lentz and Barrett (2005) . See as well Little et al. (2001) , McPeak and Barrett (2001) , McPeak (2003) , and Kaburo-Mariara (2003) . It thus seems in data from the region that herd size and migration probability are indeed positively correlated. Using a game-theoretic model of migration and conservation Ruttan and Borgerhoff Mulder (1999) also lend theoretical support to the idea that richer herders are more likely to migrate to satellite grazing reserves. the migration decisions of both pastoralists are defined as strategic complements. Mathematically, strategic complementarity requires that 
In words, the positive security externality effect generated by an increase in pastoralist 2's wealth (|∂θ/∂L 2 |) must outweigh the inextricable nonpositive appropriation externality effect. If the rangeland conditions in the satellite area are such that the new occupancy rate is still less than its carrying capacity, then the requirement for strategic complementarity unambiguously holds and a marginal rise in wealth of pastoralist 2 generates only a positive public goods security externality, enhancing pastoralist 1's expected benefits from migrating. Conversely, in the absence of the risk of livestock raiding (θ = 0, and |∂θ/∂L 2 | = 0), the requirement for strategic complementarity will never be satisfied. The corollary conditions for when the migration choices of pastoralist 1 and 2 constitute strategic substitutes can be readily derived in an analogous fashion.
In the case where m 2 = 0, the numerator of (4) equals
Thus, a marginal increase in the herd size of the non-migrating pastoralist either leaves the migration decision of his fellow kin unaffected or lowers the latter's migration threshold. In sum, we establish that: By similar use of the Implicit Function Theorem, one can readily establish that a rise in food aid transfers unambiguously increases pastoralist 1's migration threshold by increasing the cost of migration. 20 As a consequence, the required minimal herd size to make migration attractive increases in the level of freely available food transfers.
PROPOSITION 3: An increase in the total amount of freely available transfers raises pastoralist 1's migration threshold.
A marginal rise in pastoralist 3's herd size (weakly) increases pastoralist 1's migration threshold because it increases the risk of livestock loss (see footnote 12) and may affect productivity in the satellite area due to an appropriation externality.
PROPOSITION 4: Pastoralist 1's migration threshold is weakly increasing in the hostile pastoralist's herd size at the satellite area.
Rainfall obviously influences pastoralist 1's equilibrium migration strategy. Increased rainfall in the satellite area lowers pastoralist 1's migration threshold because productivity away improves. A marginal increase in rainfall also increases the carrying capacity of the satellite area, possibly reducing η S and thereby creating further productivity gains. Conversely, if rainfall increases in the base area, pastoralist 1's migration threshold increases because it stimulates base area livestock productivity both directly and indirectly by potentially mitigating local appropriation externalities by increasing the base area's carrying capacity. 21 In sum, microvariability in precipitation induces pastoralists to follow the rains, migrating if it falls in the satellite area, staying if it falls around the base camp.
20 A formal proof of this and other omitted (but we believe straightforward) claims to follow, all using the same Implicit Function Theorem technique that led to Proposition 2, are available on request from the authors. 21 Higher rainfall in the base area diminishes [f S (RF S ) -f B (RF B ) ] by a factor which is greater than the induced reduction in the value of Ω. Accordingly, ceteris paribus, increased rainfall in the base area makes it less likely that the migration condition is fulfilled. The final relation we seek to establish in this section relates to change in the security risk parameter, θ. An increase in the exogenous risk of raiding, perhaps due to the spread of modern weaponry, or to increased interethnic tensions due to political disputes, diminishes pastoralist 1's expected payoff from migrating and thus dampens his propensity to migrate.
PROPOSITION 6: An increase in the exogenous risk of raiding generates an upward shift in pastoralist 1's migration threshold.
The insights summarized in these six propositions lay the foundation for the next section, which explores transfer choices as the rational outcome of pastoralists' strategic interdependence through both appropriation and security externalities. The tradeoffs between risk of violence and livestock raiding and stocking rate pressures on common property rangelands create a limited space in which livestock transfers occur. The pattern of these transfers reflects particular combinations of ecological conditions, ex ante herd distributions, external transfer volumes, and the exogenous probability of violence. This matches the empirical evidence on east African pastoralists that extant theories cannot readily explain.
Two-person non-cooperative migration game
The preceding section treated the decision of pastoralist 1 in isolation from the simultaneous, interdependent choice of the other pastoralist so as to better understand the nature and determinants of the crucial migration choice. In this section, we treat the two pastoralists' decisions as a sequential, noncooperative game of transfer followed by migration choices in order to tease out the conditions under which transfers emerge in equilibrium in the absence of altruism or repeated interactions that might permit endogenously enforceable informal insurance contracts.
The intuition of the results we develop runs as follows. The larger an individual's herd, the greater the incentive to migrate to the satellite area, ceteris paribus. When stocking rate
pressures on the open range are low or nonexistent and there is real risk of livestock raids, a relatively wealthy, migrating pastoralist may then benefit from manipulating a poorer ally's independent migration choice by transferring animals to him and thereby inducing him to move voluntarily, and thus to fight alongside the bigger herder against their common foe. 22 However, some pastoralists are so poor that the transfer necessary to induce them to migrate is excessive relative to the security externality benefits the wealthier herder would enjoy.
23
As a consequence, the resulting egalitarian transfers are limited in two crucial senses.
First, they are limited to the transfer level necessary just to bring one's ally to his migration threshold and thereby induce him to move -and fight -alongside the donor. 24 Thus transfer volumes are small. 25 Second, they are limited only to ally households that are below but reasonably near the migration threshold, so that the security externality benefits can justify the cost of the animals given away. One outcome is that the poorest members of the ethnic group do not receive internal transfers (just external transfers of food aid), have herd sizes too small to migrate, and are consequently trapped in a relatively low productivity equilibrium.
This gives rise to a second, distinct type of manipulative transfer. If overstocking pressures are significant around the base areas, some pastoralists may find it in their interest to transfer an animal to another herder whose ex ante herd size lies just below his migration threshold, so as to induce the recipient to move and thereby increasing the productivity of the remainder of the donor's herd. If the probability of migration is increasing in herd size, such transfers to induce others to vacate shared rangelands around a base camp will typically be regressive, from poorer herders to slightly wealthier ones, although in principle such transfers could be to anyone. Still, this gives us a candidate explanation for the (infrequent) observation of modest regressive livestock transfers among east African pastoralists. 26 There thus exist statedependent interdependencies between migration choices undertaken by pastoralists sharing a common social identity, manipulative interhousehold transfer behaviors, and low-level productivity equilibria for pastoralists trapped in and around rangeland towns.
Without loss of generality, let 1 be the wealthier of the two herders in the same ethnic
). Given the discrete, simultaneous migration decision by these two agents, in theory there exist four different combinations of migration strategies that can possibly emerge.
However, Proposition 1 rules out one of these possibilities because if 1 does not choose to migrate, then neither will 2 move because migration incentives are increasing in herd size. Figure   1 depicts the feasible strategy space of three migration/no migration combinations.
The problem, from pastoralist 1's perspective, is now one of maximizing expected income subject to the independent choice of pastoralist 2. Each of the two herders is 26 One likely reason for the infrequency of such transfers would be the coordination problem that exists when one generalizes beyond the two person game setting we employ here. Since inducing those nearest their migration threshold to move so as to relieve pressure on the commons is a public good, there exist incentives to free ride.
simultaneously solving the migration choice problem in (1). The key now is to recognize that their common social identity can create an incentive for either 1 or 2 to offer his fellow group member a side payment in the form of an interhousehold livestock transfer, in order to induce the other to migrate. To be more precise, 1's migration choice now becomes 27 Intuitively, β 12 >0 only when the transfer is necessary and sufficient to induce 2 to migrate (that is, when herder 2's incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied), and when the security benefits to 1 of 2's migration outweigh the costs of both relinquishing wealth and potentially aggravating the resource appropriation externality in the satellite area (that is, when herder 1's rationality constraint is satisfied). The minimum transfer necessary to induce 2 to move will be . This is the sense in which transfers are limited in volume and can exclude both the poorest and richest pastoralists under contemporary conditions. If the migration threshold is reasonably high, perhaps because food aid 27 We will shortly consider the possibility of β 21 = -β 12 , but abstract from this for the moment. In theory, variable returns to scale -initially increasing, then decreasing -could also give rise to the coexistence of progressive and regressive transfers. One would see the regressive transfers at the low end of the wealth distribution, as poor herders seek to hand over their herd to the bigger herders, and the progressive at the upper tail as the wealthy herders reduce their herds through transfers to smaller neighbors. We know of no empirical evidence to support the variable returns hypothesis in this setting, however, and each of the several animal scientists we asked discounted this explanation as highly unlikely. Among other reasons, there would exist serious agency problems (the transferee could sell or slaughter the extra animals and simply claim they were eaten by wildlife predators), as similarly reflected in the lack of any significant hiring of herders (unlike in West Africa ] is nonempty, then a regressive transfer will take place in equilibrium.
Let us now summarize the feasible options in strategy space. Progressive interhousehold transfers intended by 1 to induce 2 to migrate and fight alongside him necessarily occur only if both parties ultimately move to the satellite area, fostering ethnic conflict over scarce resources (m 1 = m 2 =1), as shown in Figure 2 . Note, however, that in principle one could see regressive transfers because the security externality creates a coordination game best resolved by a small transfer from the poorer herder to the wealthier one so as to ensure that 1 migrates regardless of 2's choice. Figure 3 
The result is that not only are transfers limited to within the social group, but the fact that β 12 max is decreasing in L 1 beyond some threshold point and that β 12 min is decreasing in L 2 limits the wealth space within which progressive interhousehold transfers occur. The poorest pastoralists (those in the neighborhood of L 2 =0 in Figure 2 ) receive no wealth transfers and the biggest herders make no transfers. This is a limited rational egalitarianism in which distributionally progressive transfers flow from an "upper middle class" to a "lower middle class" as a result of agents'
30 Given a finite set of fellow community members, however, 2 may enjoy some bargaining power and be able to extract a greater transfer, although never beyond the β 12 max individual rationality constraint imposed by 1's choice problem. We leave this bargaining game refinement to future work. 31 Recall from section 3 that the exogenous factors, including the ex ante herd distribution, determine L *2 by establishing the differential range productivity, fixed and variable movement costs, and the range appropriation and physical security externality values. So β 12 min changes with those parameters too. A situation where no equilibrium transfers occur is more likely to arise as the exogenous risk of raiding parameter increases, the carrying capacity at the satellite area decreases (leaving no scope for cases where the induced positive security externality surpasses the negative competition externality), the base-satellite productivity differences are low and the level of food transfers is high. Such parameter value shifts reflect the stylized changes over the past generation in conditions on the east African rangelands described in section 2 and may help explain the apparent reduction in interhousehold transfers observed among pastoralists there.
Conclusions
Although models of interhousehold transfers have long fascinated economists and other social scientists, the extant workhorse models based on altruism or mutual insurance appear insufficient to explain some patterns of transfers and of intertemporal change in those behaviors. We illustrate this in the case of east African pastoralists and use that case to motivate an alternative, complementary model of transfer behavior. By construction, we rule out altruism and mutual insurance as possible explanations. Yet multiple externalities, in our case related to security and common property use, give rise to strategic complementarities inducing voluntary unrequited transfers in some states of nature, and in other states to strategic substitutability extinguishing incentives to make transfers. The model thereby predicts transfers that are limited in frequency, scope, size and distributional reach, and at times flow from poorer to richer households. These characteristics are consistent with the empirical evidence among east African pastoralists, which cannot be reconciled with models based on altruism or mutual insurance.
Our model can also explain the observed decline of transfers in the region as a natural byproduct of changing environmental conditions -in our example, increased town-based provision of food aid, diffusion of lethal small arms resulting in increased inter-group violence, and reduced rangeland carrying capacity -that exogenously affect transfer incentives. Reduced transfers therefore need not reflect cultural or moral decline, as would be true under canonical altruism-or insurance-based models of interhousehold transfers. Although the hypotheses generated by our model are the only ones we can find that are consistent with the mass of ethnographic, range science and economic evidence on which we draw, they are unfortunately not directly testable with available data. Nor would we expect new data to shed much light on this phenomenon since we are trying to explain an important phenomenon that has largely vanished, it seems.
The theoretical model nonetheless provides an alternative, integrated understanding of pastoralists' migration and interhousehold transfer behavior with significant policy implications.
Interventions can change the biophysical and socioeconomic environment in which pastoralists make migration and transfer choices, perhaps inducing a renaissance in progressive interhousehold transfers or maybe (unintentionally) further discouraging such acts. Our model suggests that the provision of town-specific public services -modeled here as police protection and food aid distribution -induces a natural decline in private giving. While welfare may be increased due to the provision of public services and external transfers and the displacement effect need not be one for one, the incentives to undertake manipulative transfers decline. These incentives could be reversed through other public investments not yet taken. In particular, interventions to reduce inter-group violence -e.g., through serious conflict resolution intermediation efforts or the geographic expansion of police protection -and to maintain or increase rangeland carrying capacity through improved water and range management could stimulate pastoralist mobility, which remains the key to welfare and wealth accumulation among these peoples, and thereby encourage renewal of progressive interhousehold transfers.
The core principle of our model -that transfers may be state-conditional, rational responses to identity-dependent strategic complementarities between agents affected by one or more externalities -and the issue of endogenous provision of security when people identify themselves with distinct social groups both apply more widely than just to the very specific context of east African pastoralism. We now briefly propose two concrete, alternative settings where variants of the mechanism modeled here may well apply and merit further exploration.
First, consider two different illustrative cases of joint human migration across long distances. One involves skilled workers moving from developing countries to foreign lands who often provide a self-serving transfer (e.g., a plane ticket) to a poorer clanswoman so as to induce her to migrate with them and subsequently provide child care services that are otherwise available in the destination city. The reason is often a desire to preserve the child's natal culture and language, i.e., security against cultural erosion, as reflected in the fact that such behaviors appear (very casually) more likely the fewer countrymen the skilled migrant expects to find in the destination and the more alien or even hostile the host culture. Further, such transfers appear less likely the greater the crowding that would result from co-residence with the poorer child care
provider. Similarly, migrants from rural villages often use transfers to induce a neighbor or kinsman to migrate with them to a distant city where having a friend and ally can provide valuable security in an otherwise-insecure setting if one does not have reliable prior contacts in the destination, but can also create competition for living space, employment, etc. In both cases, trade-offs between security and a common resource externality can help explain the emergence, under particular environmental parameters, of strategic complementarities that induce transfers that appear neither altruistic nor due to mutual insurance.
The other example we offer, less straightforward but equally compelling, is that of "foot soldiers" in a street gang engaged in illegal activities such as drug sales or prostitution. Gang members have an incentive to band together so as to protect their turf against rival gangs. But because they are also competitors for a limited resource (e.g., prospective customers, social standing), this creates (at least pecuniary) externalities. So long as the former externality dominates, there is an incentive to give costly gifts -drugs, weapons, money, a uniform, etc. -to induce a prospective member to join the gang, but not for altruistic or mutual insurance reasons.
These examples illustrate how tradeoffs between a negative common property externality and a positive security externality in common property settings may affect behaviors of widespread interest and be more widespread than is currently appreciated. When weak states are unable or unwilling to provide security services, individuals must resolve that state failure through non-market coordination mechanisms that rely heavily on group identity. The need to endogenously provide security influences economic behavior. Such insights may help resolve some behavioral puzzles, including but not only the case of interhousehold transfers among east African pastoralists. 
